

**NAME**

`CMS_decrypt` - decrypt content from a CMS envelopedData structure

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/cms.h>
```

```
int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

`CMS_decrypt()` extracts and decrypts the content from a CMS EnvelopedData structure. **pkey** is the private key of the recipient, **cert** is the recipient's certificate, **out** is a BIO to write the content to and **flags** is an optional set of flags.

The **dcont** parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content is detached. It will normally be set to NULL.

**NOTES**

`OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms()` (or equivalent) should be called before using this function or errors about unknown algorithms will occur.

Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS structure.

If **cert** is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not guaranteed to) ultimately return a padding error only. If `CMS_decrypt()` just returned an error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to decrypt an attacker could use this in a timing attack. If the special flag **CMS\_DEBUG\_DECRYPT** is set then the above behaviour is modified and an error is returned if no recipient encrypted key can be decrypted **without** generating a random content encryption key. Applications should use this flag with **extreme caution** especially in automated gateways as it can leave them open to attack.

It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure in advance using the CMS utility functions such as `CMS_set1_pkey()`. In this case both **cert** and **pkey** should be set to NULL.

To process KEKRecipientInfo types `CMS_set1_key()` or `CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key()` and `CMS_ReceipientInfo_decrypt()` should be called before `CMS_decrypt()` and **cert** and **pkey** set to NULL.

The following flags can be passed in the **flags** parameter.

If the **CMS\_TEXT** flag is set MIME headers for type **text/plain** are deleted from the content. If the content is not of type **text/plain** then an error is returned.

**RETURN VALUES**

`CMS_decrypt()` returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure. The error can be obtained from `ERR_get_error(3)`

**BUGS**

The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as mentioned in `CMS_verify()` also applies to `CMS_decrypt()`.

**SEE ALSO**

`ERR_get_error(3)`, `CMS_encrypt(3)`

**HISTORY**

`CMS_decrypt()` was added to OpenSSL 0.9.8